ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 35
SAILING THE NEW
WINE-DARK SEA
SPACE AS A MILITARY AREA
OF RESPONSIBILITY
John E. Shaw
JEan PurgaSon
amy SoilEau
e designation of a new military area of responsibility is highly signicant change, de-
noting the major structural and functional dierences between the current US Space
Command and its predecessor, which existed between 1985 and 2002. A few propositions
can guide our approach to accomplishing the command’s Unied Command Plan respon-
sibilities: the area NOT in the US Space Command AOR is the most special place in the
cosmos; the word “global” cannot adequately describe the political/military range of
national security considerations; the concept of key terrain must be reimagined in the
domain; and the military space AOR has relevance for everyone.
O
ver the past two years, we have witnessed signicant change in the space
arena.
1
e United States and its Allies and partners have seen an exciting
and almost exponential increase in commercial space while also witnessing
their competitors expanding their presence and capability. ese changes and our
ever- growing dependence on space for everyday life led to the stand up of United
States Space Command and United States Space Force. While their statutory responsi-
bilities dier, both organizations focus on the protection and defense of space to en-
sure free and unfettered access to the domain and continued delivery of space- enabled
capabilities to the terrestrial spheres.
e creation and delineation of these organizations mark a signicant milestone
for the future of human activity in space. Such inection points, aptly characterized by
historian omas Cahill as “Hinges of History” in his eponymous series of books, occur
relatively infrequently, but always with dramatic eect. Cahill’s central thesis is that
history is not just linear but rather represents a set of punctuated events that could
have taken history (and consequently, the future) in any number of directions. Decades
1. is article is an expansion on remarks delivered by Lieutenant General John Shaw at the Space
Warghter Luncheon, 2021 National Space Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO, https://youtu.be/n6BY-
axNklvA. is article proposes two new English language words (“supraglobal” and “downwell”), and two
new denitions to two exisitng words (“astrographic” and “upwell”). e authors wish to thank Dr. Andrea
Van Nort (USAFA English Department) and Colonel Luke Sauter (USAFA Astronatics Dept Head) for
their assistance in the development of these words and their denitions. e authors would also like to
oer a special thanks to Mr. Andre Shappell for his invaluable assistance in reviewing the content of
this article.
ÆTHER:
A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
36 Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2022
Sailing the New Wine- Dark Sea
aer landing a man on the moon, and aer years of remarkable technological ad-
vancements inherent in harnessing the benets of space- based assets, we are again
facing changes so dramatic that they will fundamentally alter the geopolitical environ-
ment on Earth.
e fourth installment of Cahill’s series, Sailing the Wine- Dark Sea: Why the Greeks
Matter, details the Greeks’ contributions to modern society, both good and bad. Cahill
writes of Greek inuence on art, philosophy, statecra, culture, literature, architecture,
poetry, and drama, among many other inuences. He also writes extensively about the
Greek inuence on the modern way of war.
2
roughout, Cahill emphasizes the sig-
nicance of ancient history to events occurring today—an ode to the Greeks and how
they built much of the foundation for our twenty-rst-century civilization. Curiously,
the book provides what could be the perfect model for describing the signicance of
contemporary inection points in the development of the space domain.
At some point, were he to become enamored with these recent and fascinating
changes in the space arena, Cahill might be compelled to write a new installment in
his series, detailing the astonishing developments of the past couple of years as yet
another hinge of history. One chapter might focus on China’s destruction of their de-
funct weather satellite in 2007. Another could describe the logic behind the founding
of the United States Space Force. With its organize, train, and equip responsibilities,
the newly formed service will usher in an era of space- based capabilities focused on
ex- geosynchronous operations that would not have proliferated otherwise.
Yet another chapter could focus on the establishment of the new US Space Com-
mand. Space operations already naturally serve as global integration activities. Space
eects intended for one geographic area are likely to inuence, if not directly alter,
other areas. So when the entirety of Department of Defense (DOD) space operations,
activities, and investments are aligned under the direction of a single combatant com-
mand, the capacity for integrating military space with disparate terrestrial military
objectives drastically improves.
Were Cahill to ask, we would advise another chapter on a small clause written into
the Unied Command Plan at the establishment of US Space Command. While the
Unied Command Plan is the overarching document that details the major new mis-
sion responsibilities of US Space Command and its commander, one small, seemingly
mundane section in it is revolutionary: the plan assigned US Space Command its own
military area of responsibility (AOR).
Seemingly a minor detail, the designation of a new AOR is actually a highly signi-
cant change, denoting the major structural and functional dierences between the
current US Space Command and its predecessor, which existed between 1985 and
2002. We are only beginning to understand the potential of this change. A baseline
denition and common understanding of what constitutes an AOR is fundamental to
understanding why this change is so revolutionary.
2. omas Cahill, Sailing the Wine- Dark Sea: Why the Greeks Matter (New York: Random House,
2003).
Shaw, Purgason, and Soileau
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 37
Doctrinally, an AOR is dened as “the geographical area associated with a combatant
command within which a geographic combatant commander has the authority to
plan and conduct operations.”
3
But the idea of an AOR predates Joint publications sig-
nicantly. For millennia, AORs have been used as a way for armies, nations, or em-
pires to divide geographic areas of national interest. Identied AORs have certain
characteristics and have always been dened by lines on a map. ese lines are dic-
tated by a number of factors such as terrain, political context, demographics, and most
importantly, threats. Ideally, the sum of all assigned AORs and operations within them
meets the strategic objectives of the army, nation, or empire that created them. Areas
of operations are not stovepipes, as they are meant to contribute to the attainment of a
holistic grand strategy.
Several historical examples of military AORs provide insight into their creation and
value. In his account of the pacication of Gaul, Julius Caesar penned probably the
most famous AOR in literature. He started this famous work with “Gaul as a whole
divided into three parts.”
4
In particular, Julius Caesar’s justication for why Gaul was
divided into three parts is of interest: it was fundamentally about terrain, dierent rule
of law, and threats.
Caesar took great care to identify the dierences in proximity to Germanic terri-
tory, natural territory borders, and the courage of the dierent factions in each AOR.
Together, the combined AORs of Gaul served as a strategic buer between Rome and
the Germanic tribes. In fact, one of the rst military objectives Caesar personally re-
called in Gaul was to return the Helvetii, a tribe of Gaul, to their native lands to deter
the Germanic tribes from crossing the Rhine.
5
By geographically separating Gaul into
three areas, Caesar gave his subordinate commanders responsibility for governing
each region separately but with a common cause in mind. e most important aspect
of Caesar’s pacication of Gaul may be the fact that he never mentioned one AOR be-
ing more important or inuential than the others; they were all equally important to
the successful completion of his campaign.
A more modern example familiar to World War II history enthusiasts is the Pacic
eater during that conict. ough today’s singularly dened United States Indo-
Pacic Command AOR is the largest US terrestrial geographic theater, the Pacic
eater in World War II was actually divided into two AORs. e Southwestern sec-
tion consisting predominantly of large land masses was given to General Douglas
McArthur, and the section comprising wide areas of open ocean, the Central Pacic,
was given to Admiral Chester Nimitz.
While McArthur completed an island- hopping campaign mainly threatened by
land- based airpower, Nimitz conducted a naval campaign against a formidable Japa-
nese carrier force and its attendant sea- based airpower. Although this approach was
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta (CJCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
Joint Publication-1 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2017), GL-5.
4. Julius Caesar, War Commentaries: De Bello Gallico (London: Dutton, 1953), 11.
5. Caesar, War Commentaries, 28.
38 Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2022
Sailing the New Wine- Dark Sea
criticized for disaggregating limited Allied resources, it required the Japanese to dis-
perse their defensive forces.
6
MacArthur focused on isolating key terrain with strong
Japanese military presence while securing less-defended islands on his path toward
Japan.
7
Between the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, Nimitz dimin-
ished Japanese carrier eet capabilities, resulting in relative freedom of maneuver for
Allied maritime forces in the Pacic.
8
By enabling bombing missions from the Mari-
anas and restricting commerce and resupply through control of the seas surrounding
Japan, both AORs proved necessary to achieve victory against the Japanese.
In these past cases as in the present, the 2019 Unied Command Plan assigned an
AOR to US Space Command to protect a critical area for national security. is is not
unlike the rationale for the division of the Pacic region into two AORs in World War
II. But the application of the AOR concept to space presents its own unique set of
challenges. Space is signicantly dierent from any previous AOR. For the rst time in
military history, a military AOR is not dened by geographic lines on a map. In fact,
the etymology of the word geographic is Greek and means “drawn on the earth.”
In light of this key distinction, a better term denes the US Space Command AOR:
astrographic, which means “drawn on the stars.”
9
All other combatant commands’
AORs are dened by latitude and longitude lines on a map or geographic features.
United States European Command is responsible for continental Europe and its proxi-
mate bodies of water. e AOR assigned to US Indo- Pacic Command roughly covers
the southern Asian continental landmass, southeastern Asian nations and associated
waters, and the Indian Ocean.
Dened in a novel manner, US Space Command’s AOR is the space beyond 100km
of altitude above the mean surface level of the earth—indescribably vast. And while
100km might sound like a random, albeit straightforward round number, it was not
an arbitrary selection—100km is the Kármán Line, dened as the point that requires
vehicles to exceed actual orbital speed at that altitude in order to generate li.
10
ere
may not be a more eloquent or scientically based possible denition for the bound-
ary between air and space.
As the ramications of this new AOR for the nation are explored, a few proposi-
tions can guide our approach to accomplishing the command’s Unied Command
Plan responsibilities: (1) the area NOT in the US Space Command AOR is the most
special place in the cosmos; (2) the word “global” is increasingly insucient to fully
describe the political/military range of national security considerations; (3) the
6. omas E. Grith Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest
Pacic (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 49.
7. Grith, MacArthur’s Airman, 235.
8. Craig L. Simmons, e Battle of Midway (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 184–85.
9. is represents a new denition of astrographic developed in part by the authors. It is an adjective
meaning drawn on the star or an area dened by boundaries or features in space.
10. Eric Betz, “e Kármán Line: Where Does Space Begin?,” Astronomy, March 5, 2021, https://
astronomy.com/.
Shaw, Purgason, and Soileau
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 39
concept of key terrain must be reimagined in the domain; and (4) the military space
AOR has relevance for everyone.
Proposition Alpha Prime
e area NOT in the US Space Command area of responsibility is the most special
place in the cosmos.
e place in the universe not covered by the space AOR, that is, 100km of altitude
and down—approximately 1x10-24 percent of the known universe—is the most spe-
cial place in the cosmos and will remain so for millennia to come.
11
We do not explore
space simply for the sake of exploring space; we do it for the benet of humankind.
And those humans live on Earth. It is critical to remember this fact. Human activity in
space starts below 100km, and these operations and eorts certainly apply to US
Space Command.
e command must ensure it delivers capabilities to Joint warghters outside the
space AOR and to human society at large. Earth is where every human was born and
where most humans have remained except for about 600 individuals lucky enough to
spend time in space (most just slightly above the Kármán Line). Proposition Alpha
Prime will hold rm as humans continue to explore, even when spacefaring nations
begin to visit other planets.
Proposition Two
e word “global” is increasingly insucient to fully describe the political/military
range of national security considerations.
e Department of Defense has diligently endeavored in recent years to transcend
regional thinking. When it comes to current operations, military professionals strive
to focus on global competition and globally integrated operations. But viewing opera-
tions on Earth without accounting for the vast AOR assigned to US Space Command
articially constrains the perspective and considerations available to decision makers
to accomplish a desired national security objective.
How might the Department remedy this? About 15–20 years ago, the word “supra-
national” was introduced to discuss threats that superseded the borders of nation- states.
Given the command’s domain and responsibilities, a new term may be warranted:
supraglobal, or those things that are relevant to military or political matters that en-
compass the globe and relevant activities in the space beyond it.
ough global can mean applied to the whole of something, the term is more com-
monly used in military circles to distinguish the needs of the entire Joint/combined
Force from those that are regionally focused.
12
e English language does not have a
11. Calculated using the isotropy theory assumption that the universe is expanding in all directions at
the same rate and recent estimations of current expansion radius.
12. Merriam- Webster Online, s.v. “global,” accessed December 22, 2021, https://www.merriam- webster
.com/.
40 Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2022
Sailing the New Wine- Dark Sea
word that adequately conveys a sense of that which lies beyond the global terrain, but
supraglobal could be a remedy. is term integrates the Department’s current ap-
proach to globally integrated operations with the nascent idea of treating the space
AOR as an operational domain linked to all of the terrestrial domains.
e concept of an AOR is actually quite new in the military space world. Prior to
the establishment of the new US Space Command, United States Strategic Command
had responsibility for space operations, but the AOR was not dened, nor was it de-
ned for the original US Space Command. Military space missions under US Strategic
Command were treated doctrinally as a functional combatant command and primarily
provided transregional supporting capabilities to geographic combatant commands.
Since the new US Space Command has been given an AOR, the space domain can
be dened as an operational domain with potential threats. ose threats are increas-
ing, our reliance on space is expanding, and this dependence will not change anytime
soon. e nature of military space requires a change of thought. Much remains to
learn and understand: What is the key terrain of the domain? What are the maneu-
vers, needs, challenges, and potential realities of this domain? ese questions lead to
the next proposition.
Proposition Three
e concept of key terrain must be reimagined in the space domain.
Key terrain is a concept as old as warfare and requires nuanced conceptual thinking
in dierent domains. In doctrine, key terrain is dened as “any locality, or area, the
seizure or retention of which aords a marked advantage to either combatant.”
13
But
such advantages are gained dierently from one domain to another.
Because of vast elevation dierences in the land domain, taking the high ground
delivered decisive advantage for one’s forces. In traditional naval operations, such el-
evation dierences do not exist, and key terrain was more inuenced by the tides, cur-
rents, and maritime chokepoints. When airpower became a military domain in the
early twentieth century, key terrain for the air was determined by the range forces
could travel, or maintain li, versus explicit terrain features. What does this mean for
the space domain? A strong argument can be made that the natural dierences in the
physical environments between space operations and terrestrial operations are greater
than dierences in operations between the terrestrial domains.
In space, the energy required for movement and maneuver diers from that of ter-
restrial operations; moving toward and away from the earth is not as simple as moving
downhill and uphill, respectively. For example, it takes essentially the same amount of
energy to move from circular geosynchronous orbit (GEO) to circular medium Earth
orbit (MEO) as it takes to move from circular MEO to circular GEO, which is very
dierent from experiences such as hiking up and down a mountain on Earth.
13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta (CJCS), DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v.
“key terrain,” (Washington, DC: CJCS, November 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/.
Shaw, Purgason, and Soileau
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 41
Using human intuition to describe such movements in space can be contrary to
physical reality. When discussing China destroying its defunct weather satellite in
2007 or Russia’s direct- ascent antisatellite test in 2021, the inference most people
make, based on the popular description of those activities as “shooting a satellite
down,” is not accurate. If either nation had in fact “shot it down,” the world would not
be having to cope with thousands of pieces of debris still in orbit from those events.
“Shooting something down” in space is not an accurate description. What actually
occurred is signicantly worse.
So how can maneuver, and by extension key terrain, in space be better visualized?
Terrain in the space domain is best described by those beautiful Einsteinian curves in
spacetime known as gravity wells. Generally speaking, a gravity well describes the
amount of force celestial bodies exert on objects in space.
14
e space domain is home to many gravity wells. In practical terms, space opera-
tions planners must account for movement within the Earth gravity well, the com-
bined Earth and moon gravity well, and within the sun’s gravity well. Similar to maritime
reliance on tides and currents before the invention of the steam engine, the majority
of movement in space is largely dictated by gravitational forces and initial momentum
(at least until another oset in space energy and propulsion is realized). As such, posi-
tions that provide advantage, or key terrain, will remain connected to these natural
forces due to limited energy alternatives. For the foreseeable future, military, civil, and
commercial actors in space will be required to plan and budget for future space opera-
tions with this constraint in mind.
A helpful way to describe the connection of gravitational energy to movement and
maneuver between orbits is to use the terms “upwell” and “downwell,” as either verbs
or adjectives. Upwell can be dened as a verb (to increase orbital energy within a
gravity well), an adverb (in the direction of increased orbital energy within a gravity
well), or as an adjective (in a position of increased orbital energy within a gravity well).
Downwell can be also be dened as a verb (to decrease orbital energy within a gravity
well), an adverb (in the direction of decreased orbital energy within a gravity well),
and as an adjective (in a position of decreased orbital energy within a gravity well).
Adding the denition “increasing orbital energy within a gravity well” to “upwell”
is sucient, but “downwell,” or “decreasing orbital energy within a gravity well,” is not
a currently recognized word in the English language. Still, these proposed words and
denitions would better capture the unique relationship of movement and energy in
the space domain.
By connecting movement in space with the energy necessary to accomplish it, op-
erations in the space domain would be dierentiated from the common understand-
ing of movement in the land, sea, and air domains. Such separation is necessary to
adequately identify and communicate the unique aspects of space movement and
maneuver and the resulting key terrain. As we increase the understanding of domain
14. Northwestern University, “Space Environment: What Is a Gravity Well?,” Northwestern University
(website), https://www.qrg.northwestern.edu/.
42 Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2022
Sailing the New Wine- Dark Sea
specics, a wider range of actors will acknowledge the complexity of operating in the
US Space Command AOR and its value to the nation and broader international
community.
Proposition Four
e military space area of responsibility has relevance for everyone.
e ways in which US Space Command, with the help of its service components,
operates within the AOR is relevant to all activity in space. At a baseline level, the
AOR directly enhances Joint and combined operations across the globe and beyond.
Indispensable capabilities such as missile warning; position, navigation, and timing; en-
vironmental monitoring; and satellite communications allow forward- deployed forces
to carry out missions with lightning precision across multiple domains. Space- based
nuclear command, control, and communications systems are bedrocks of the nuclear
deterrent our nation relies on to prevent catastrophic attacks on the homeland. Domain
awareness yields a thorough understanding of actions and intent in the AOR to mini-
mize unintended consequences or miscommunication with other spacefaring actors.
Competitors see the military benets of US space- based capabilities and are rapidly
moving to close the advantage gap. Over the last decade and a half, the United States,
its Allies, and partners observed as weapons testing in the domain created challenges
for responsible space activity and freedom of action in, from, and to space. With a des-
ignated AOR, however, US national leadership enabled unity of eort in space to deter
aggression and deliver superior space combat power in the event deterrence fails.
United States Space Command will protect and defend this AOR and hopes potential
malign actors are watching. And while relevance of the command’s AOR to military
operations might be considered a given, its benets extend much further in scope.
e general population of Earth benets as well, even if most people may not be
aware of it. Nearly every person across the planet is an end user of space capabilities,
and day- to- day life activities are protected by the formation of the AOR. Since its in-
ception, the global positioning system (GPS) has enabled over $1.4 trillion in US eco-
nomic benets.
15
Whenever people visit a gas station and pay at the pump or use an ATM, they are
using space. Seafaring maritime trac utilizes position, navigation, and timing data to
deliver goods from overseas ports to local stores and retailers. Farmers use space as-
sets to optimize crop outputs, lowering produce costs at the grocery store, and people
are able to near- instantaneously converse across the planet due to satellite communi-
cations. Organizing US military space capabilities to work together in the AOR allows
the Joint Force to identify threat indicators and proactively protect myriad GPS
quality- of- life enhancers.
15. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Oce of Space Commerce, DOC Study on
Economic Benets of GPS, Oce of Space Commerce (website), https://www.space.commerce.gov/.
Shaw, Purgason, and Soileau
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 43
Similarly, members of the commercial space industry should be interested in the
formation of the US Space Command AOR. In 2020, the global space economy in-
creased to $447 billion with approximately 80 percent of the total due to commercial
endeavors.
16
By some estimates, another 17,000 satellites will be launched by 2030,
most with commercial origins.
17
With a myriad of new commercial space assets pro-
jected in the near future, the command’s ability to accurately depict the space operat-
ing environment and avoid debris- causing collisions will be foundational in creating
predictable conditions for sustained business growth in the domain.
roughout history, maritime merchant trac operated with more condence
knowing a navy was close by to keep things safe and transparent. Similar conditions
must be fostered for safeguarding space commerce. Currently, DOD space assets provide
early warning of potential collisions and notify aected commercial entities, reducing
the chance of orbital debris or mission failure. By assigning all relevant terrestrial and
on- orbit space domain awareness sensors to US Space Command to protect the AOR,
the Department of Defense has optimized detection capabilities that protect one of
our nation’s biggest advantages—commercial- sector innovation.
Finally, civil organizations like NASA benet from having a single DOD organization
responsible for ensuring safety, security, and stability in space. e Artemis Program
will carry astronauts to the moon for the rst time in 55 years, followed by an eventual
crewed mission to Mars. Originally signed in 2020, the NASA- sponsored Artemis Ac-
cords provide a common framework to usher in a new era of space exploration. Sig-
natories armed several items conducive to cooperative space exploration including
shared access to scientic data gained, the pursuit of interoperable space technologies,
and transparent notication for areas of harmful interference.
18
As civil organizations from the international community expand human presence
further into the AOR in the name of peaceful exploration, the need to recover astro-
nauts in distress will become more complex and far- reaching. Currently, US Space
Command is charged with human space- ight support and actively supports launch
and recovery operations of US- based crewed spaceight. As humankind continues to
travel further out from the most special place in the cosmos, the command will be
ready to execute its responsibility for the human space- ight support mission.
Conclusion
Dening US Space Command’s AOR has already had a profound impact on the
way the United States, its Allies, and partners conduct operations and respond to
16. Space Foundation Editorial Team, “Global Space Economy Rose to $447B in 2020, Continuing
Five- Year Growth,” Space Foundation (website), July 15, 2021, https://www.spacefoundation.org/.
17. Satellite Pro Middle East, “17,000 Satellites To Be Built and Launched by 2030: Euroconsult,” Satel-
lite Pro Middle East (website), December 7, 2021, https://satelliteprome.com/.
18. e Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon,
Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes, US, Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
UAE, UK, October 13, 2020, US National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
44 Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2022
Sailing the New Wine- Dark Sea
aggression and threats in space. In addition to the increased integration a space AOR
will have on terrestrial operations, this development promises untold hinges of history
that will be inuenced by the understanding and execution of space operations. e
four propositions posed here are just a glimpse of considerations necessary to ade-
quately plan for the future of the space AOR.
Earth remains the most precious part of the universe. As humankind continues to
expand into the cosmos, its actions must be focused on the preservation of this tenet.
By thinking in a supraglobal fashion, decision makers will consider a more complete
range of possibilities for identifying threats to military objectives and for appropriate
astrographic as well as geographic solutions.
But before such solutions can be realized, leaders must understand how activities in
the AOR dier from activities in the terrestrial domains. Reimagining AOR core
principles such as key terrain will help spacefaring nations better analyze current
capabilities and future needs and develop appropriate doctrine in response. is ap-
proach optimizes US Space Command’s ability to protect and defend the capabilities
originating from an AOR that holds worldwide relevance. When looking back in ve
to ten years from now, it will be even more apparent how our times contributed to de-
ning a new “hinge of history,” and how how the establishment of the 100km and
above AOR became our best response to that inection point as we continue to sail
our new wine- dark sea. Æ
Lieutenant General John E. Shaw, USSF
Lieutenant General Shaw is the deputy commander of US Space Command.
Major Jean A. Purgason, USSF
Major Purgason is the special assistant to the deputy commander of US Space Command.
Captain Amy C. Soileau, USSF
Captain Soileau is the special assistant to the deputy command of US Space Command.
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